Many situations require people to act quickly, and are characterized by asymmetric information.
Introduction
Lying is pervasive in human societies and has enormous undesired economic consequences. For example, tax evasion costs about $100 million to the U.S. government every year (Gravelle, 2009) , and, according to the FBI, insurance fraud costs more than $40 million to the insurance companies every year 1 .
The fact that some people lie when that is beneficial to themselves is not surprising: the standard theory of Homo Oeconomicus assumes that no negative outcomes are associated with the act of lying and thus it explicitly predicts that people would lie, whenever telling a lie would increase their utility. However, in contrast to the theory of Homo Oeconomicus, previous research has also shown that some people do act honestly and they do so even when lying would be beneficial to all parties involved (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Cappelen, Sørensen &Tungodded, 2013; Biziou-van-Pol, Haenen, Novaro, Occhipinti-Liberman & Capraro, 2015) . These results are particularly interesting, because, in their setting, lying would not only maximize the liar's payoff, but it would also maximize social welfare and minimize inequity. Thus, not only the theory of Homo Oeconomicus predicts that subjects would lie, but also theories assuming that subjects have social preferences for minimizing economic inequalities (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) or for maximizing social welfare (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Capraro, 2013) do so. For this reason, these results have been taken as compelling evidence for the fact that individuals have an intrinsic cost of lying. Of course, this cost may be zero for a proportion of "consequentialist" subjects, who, in their decision process, weighs only the economic consequences of their actions and not the actions themselves; but, importantly, the aforementioned findings demonstrate the existence of subjects for whom the cost of lying is not 1 See https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/insurance-fraud/insurance_fraud zero: these subjects would lie only if the consequences of deception were "good enough" and, in principle, some of them may even never lie, if they have infinite cost of lying (deontological subjects).
Thus, given these individual differences in deception and given the enormous costs that lying has on social welfare, it is important to understand which factors influence dishonesty.
Here, I explore the role of time pressure. Time pressure is a particularly relevant factor to be investigated in terms of both practical and theoretical applications.
In practice, people often have very little time to think through their decisions. This may happen both in social interactions, in which people have an incentive to decide quickly because thinking carefully about the available choices may signal self-regarding motivations (Capraro & Kuilder, 2015; Hoffman, Yoeli & Nowak, 2015; Jordan, Hoffman, Nowak & Rand, 2016) , and in economic interactions, in which acting fast may be crucial to overcome competitors. For example, traders are required to make decisions within seconds after new information is obtained (Busse & Green, 2002; Kocher, Pahlke & Trautmann, 2013; Roth & Ockenfels, 2002) .
However, to the best of my knowledge, only two experimental studies have investigated the role of time pressure on honesty. In Gunia et al. (2012) , participants were told that there were two available allocations of money, Option A and Option B; senders were informed that Option A would allocate $10 to themselves and $5 to the receiver, while Option B would allocate $5 to themselves and $10 to the receiver. Senders were then told they had to choose a message to send to the receiver, between "Option A earns you more money than Option B" and "Option B earns you more money than Option A". The role of the receiver was to guess which option would maximize their own payoff. After learning these pieces of information, senders moved to the decision screen, where some were asked to decide under time pressure and others were asked to decide under time delay. Gunia et al. (2012) found that time pressure increased dishonesty. A similar result was obtained by Shalvi et al. (2012) , this time implementing a die rolling paradigm (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi) : subjects rolled a die, privately, and were asked to report the outcome, knowing that they would receive a payment equal to the reported outcome. Again, time pressure increased dishonesty.
These two studies are characterized by the fact that subjects knew their payoff maximizing strategy before entering the time manipulation: in Gunia et al. (2012) , senders were told in the instruction screen (before the time manipulation) that their payoff maximizing strategy would be to send the receiver the message "Option A earns you more money than Option B"; similarly, in Shalvi et al. (2012) , participants were told in the instruction screen (before the time manipulation) that their payoff maximizing strategy would be to declare that they obtained 6 from the die rolling.
However, in many economic and social interactions, agents are in the situation in which they know in advance that their payoff maximizing strategy would be to lie, or to stretch the truth (e.g., trading, job interviews, etc.), but they do not know exactly which strategy corresponds to lying (because that may depend on contingent last-minute information). A typical example is represented by job interviews. During an interview, it is in the applicant's best interest to stretch the truth a little bit in order to increase their chances to obtain a job offer. However, the specific lie depends on a number of contingent difficult-to-predict factors (including the specific questions being asked, the applicant's beliefs about the interviewers' expectations, etc.).
Does time pressure interfere with honesty also in these situations? And, if so, how?
This question is relevant also from a theoretical viewpoint. There is indeed one reason to expect that, in situations in which "how to lie" depends on last-minute information, time pressure may interact with honest behavior in the opposite way as the one reported by Gunia et al. (2012) and Shalvi et al. (2012) . The theoretical motivation comes from Rand and colleagues' Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH, Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; Rand et al., 2014) . The SHH argues that people internalize strategies that are optimal in their everyday interactions and tend to use them as default strategies in new and atypical situations when they have no time (or, more generally, cognitive resources) to find out which choice maximizes their payoff. Then, after deliberation, people may override their heuristics and shift their behavior towards the one that is individually optimal in the given interaction.
What does the SHH predict in terms of deceptive behavior in situations in which the payoff-maximizing strategy depends on last-minute information?
Of course, the optimal strategy in the given interaction is to lie (in this paper, I focus on black lies, that is, lies that benefit the liar at the expenses of another person). Thus, the SHH predicts that deliberation favors deception. On the other hand, since the payoff-maximizing strategy depends on last-minute information, time pressure may prevent subjects from calculating their payoff-maximizing strategy. Thus, the SHH predicts that time pressure favors social heuristics that are optimal in everyday interactions. Since most daily interactions are repeated (e.g., with friends, family members, co-workers), truth-telling, although costly in the short term, may be optimal in the long run (through numerous channels, including the social stigma that accompanies liars). Thus, the SHH predicts that intuition should favor truth-telling.
Hypothesis. In case in which lying is payoff-maximizing but the specific lie depends on last-minute information, time pressure favors honesty.
In this paper, I present a large study in support of this hypothesis.
Measure of honesty
To model the situation in which a person knows in advance that her best strategy is to lie, but she does not know exactly which strategy corresponds to lying, I use the Deception Game introduced by Biziou-van-Pol et al. (2015) , which is a variant of the standard Deception Game (Gneezy, 2005; Erat and Gneezy, 2012) . Participants are told that they will be randomly assigned to either Group 1 or Group 2, and that they will have to choose between two possible strategies:
"telling the number of the group they are assigned to" or "telling the number of the other group".
If they report the true number of the group they are assigned to, then both themselves and a randomly selected participant will get $0.10; otherwise they will get $0.20 and the other participant will get $0.09.
Method
American subjects were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (Horton, Rand, Zeckhauser, 2011; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014) . After reading the instructions, all subjects faced the same set of comprehension questions. Subjects failing any comprehension question were automatically excluded from the survey. Subjects who passed the comprehension questions were randomly assigned to play a one-shot anonymous Deception Game either under time pressure condition or under time delay. Subjects under time pressure were asked to make a decision within 5 seconds; those under time delay were asked to stop and think for at least 30 seconds before deciding. Importantly, the number of the group was communicated directly in the decision screen. Decision were collected using a blank text box in which subjects were asked to type their choice. 
Results
A total of 1,013 participants (51.6% males, mean age = 35.36) passed the comprehension questions and participated in the experiment (N=497 under time pressure, N=516 under time delay). Subjects acting under time pressure took, on average, much shorter to make a decision than subjects under time delay (10.29s vs 31.78s). I include in the analysis also subjects who failed to obey the time constraints, in order to avoid selection problems that can impair causal inference (Tinghög et al., 2013; Capraro & Cococcioni, 2015) .
Figure 1 provides visual evidence that subjects under time pressure were more honest than those under time delay (56.7% vs 44.2%). This is confirmed by logit regression predicting the probability of telling the truth as a function of a dummy variable, named "pressure", which takes value 1 if a subject acted under time pressure, and 0 otherwise (chi 2 =16, coeff=0.505, p<.001).
The positive effect of time pressure was essentially constant across sessions (Session 1: 57.8% vs 44.7%; Session 2: 56.4% vs 44.1%; Session 3: 55.9% vs 44.8%).
Next, I observe that behavior under time pressure is in fact driven by truth-telling and not by confusion. Indeed, the proportion test shows that the truth-telling under time pressure is significantly higher than 50% (56.7% +/-2%, 95% CI = [52.4%,61.1%], p=0.001). This demonstrates that truth-telling under time pressure is not driven by confused subjects.
As an additional analysis, I also observe that when I include (the log of) response time as dependent variable in the logit regression above (the log must be taken to account for a heavily right-skewed distribution), I find that time pressure retains significance (p=0.036), while response time is not significant (p=0.349). This is a somewhat interesting results, since recent research has highlighted that response times may be influenced by factors other than the extent of intuitive vs deliberative thinking, as, for example, decision conflict and strength of preferences (Krajbich, Bartling, Hare & Fehr, 2015; Evans, Dillon & Rand, 2015) . Thus, the fact that the positive effect of time pressure is not mediated by response time provides another piece of evidence in support of the interpretation that time pressure favors intuitive honesty. Since previous research shows that both honesty (Dreber & Johannesson, 2008; Childs, 2012; Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Friesen & Gangadharan, 2012; Cappelen et al., 2013; Biziou-vanPol et al., 2015) and time manipulations 
Conclusion
Dishonest actions with little economic consequences are pervasive in human societies.
For example, people often download illegal music or get on the bus without a valid travel ticket.
One of the reasons why such "small lies" are widespread is that a person can easily rationalize them by arguing that they have negligible consequences. Yet, when millions of people argue in this way, the aggregated consequences become disastrous. For example, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has estimated that, between 2004 and 2009, 30 billion songs were illegally downloaded, with enormous negative consequences for the music industry.
Similarly, it has been estimated that public transportation ticket evasion has costed 1.6 billion Euro to the Italian government in the past 10 years 2 .
Given the huge negative consequences that small lies can have on industry and society, understanding which factors affect the decision to tell them is a problem of primary importance.
In this paper, I have focused on one particular factor: time pressure. In a large study (N=1,013), I find strong evidence that time pressure increases truth-telling, especially among women.
As a theoretical explanation, I have observed that these results are consistent with a theory of social heuristics (Social Heuristics Hypothesis, Rand et al., 2014) according to which people internalize honest behavior as the intuitive response because being honest typically works well in everyday interactions (most daily interactions are with friends, family, and coworkers, and thus they repeated. Consequently, being honest, although costly in the short run, may be optimal in the long run). Thus, when acting under time pressure, people tend to rely on this automatic response, because they may not have enough time to compute their payoff-maximizing strategy. But then, after deliberation, they may override these automatic responses and shift their behavior towards the one that is optimal in the given interaction.
These results add to the growing body of literature exploring the effect of intuition on deception (Barnes, Schaubroek, Huth & Ghumman, 2011; Barnes, Gunia & Wagner, 2015; Bereby-Meyer & Shalvi, 2015; Cappelen et al., 2013; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead & Ariely, 2011; Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang & Murnigham, 2012; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Shalvi, Eldar & Bereby-Meyer, 2012; Tatatabaeian, Dale & Duran, 2015; van't Veer, Stel & van Beest, 2014) , gender differences in deception (Dreber & Johannesson, 2008; Childs, 2012; Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Friesen & Gangadharan, 2012; Cappelen et al., 2013; Biziou-van-Pol et al., 2015) , and the interaction between gender differences and cognitive processing , as well as to the body of literature in support of the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (Rand et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2014; Capraro & Cococcioni, 2015; Rand, 2016) .
These findings seem to contradict previous studies, suggesting that time pressure increases dishonest behavior (Gunia et al., 2012; Shalvi et al., 2012) . However, the design implemented in the current work differs from those used by Gunia et al. (2012) and Shalvi et al. (2012) in one crucial detail. My main methodological innovation is indeed the use of a modified version of the standard Deception Game, in which participants learn their payoff-maximizing strategy right before making their choice. I believe that such an innovation is useful to test whether truth-telling is the default strategy in those real life situations in which one's payoff maximizing strategy depends on last-minute information (e.g, trading, job interviews).
Of course, it is somewhat puzzling that changing the moment in which participants are told their payoff-maximizing strategy matters so much to reverse the sign of the causation link between cognitive processing and honesty. While the results presented in this paper can be explained by the Social Heuristics Hypothesis, this theoretical framework is unable to explain the results of Gunia et al. (2012) and Shalvi et al. (2012) . Developing a unified theoretical framework able to organize this apparently contradictory set of results is an interesting question for future theoretical and experimental research.
Another intriguing question regards a potential interaction between cognitive processing and gender. In the current experiment women behaved as honestly as men in the time delay condition, whereas time pressure had the effect of increasing honesty for both men and women, although the effect was significant only among women. One would be tempted to conclude that time pressure increases honesty for women but not for men. However, the fact that the interaction term between time pressure and gender was only marginally significant, given the large sample size, implies that such a statement should be made with extreme caution. Shedding light on this potentially relevant interaction is thus another interesting question for future research.
Experimental instructions

Introductory screen (common to all conditions)
Welcome to this HIT.
This HIT will take about two minutes. For the participation to this HIT, you will earn 40c. You can also earn additional money depending on the decisions that you will make.
To make sure you understand the situation, we will ask some simple questions, each of which has only one correct answer. If you fail to correctly answer any of those questions, the survey will automatically end and you will not receive any redemption code and consequently you will not get any payment.
With this in mind, do you wish to continue? (available answers: continue/end).
Instruction screen (common to the time pressure condition and the time delay condition)
Please read these instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money, depending on the decisions you make in the experiment.
You have been matched with another participant. Your bonus and that of the other participant depends only on your choice. The other participant does not play any active role.
There are two groups (group 1, group 2). You will be randomly assigned to one of them. You will be informed of the group you have been assigned to, but the other participant will not.
We will ask you to declare the group you have been assigned to. So you get to choose between two possible options:
Option 1: "I have been assigned to group 1." Option 2: "I have been assigned to group 2."
If you choose the option corresponding to the number of the actual group you have been assigned to, then you will receive 10c and the other participant will receive 10c.
If you choose the option corresponding to the number of the other group (the one you have not been assigned to), then you will receive 20c and the other participant will receive 9c.
Finally, only you will be informed of the particular monetary value connected to each message.
The other participant will not be informed of these monetary values.
Comprehension questions (common to all conditions)
1) What is the choice that maximize YOUR outcome? (available answers: Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the actual group you have been assigned to/Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the other group (the one you have not been assigned to).
2) What is the choice that maximize the OTHER PARTICIPANT'S outcome? (available answers: Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the actual group you have been assigned to/Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the other group (the one you have not been assigned to)).
Decision screen for subjects under time pressure and assigned to group 1
You have been assigned to group 1.
RESPOND WITHIN 5 SECONDS
Which group have you been assigned to?
(here there was a text box in which subjects could type their choice)
Decision screen for subjects under time pressure and assigned to group 2
You have been assigned to group 2.
Decision screen for subjects under time delay and assigned to group 1
THINK CAREFULLY FOR AT LEAST 30 SECONDS BEFORE CHOOSING
Decision screen for subjects under time delay and assigned to group 2
THINK CAREFULLY FOR AT LEAST 30 SECONDS BEFORE CHOOSING
